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Abstract 
This paper addresses a paradox.  On the one hand, 
discourse and rhetorical studies have provided evidence that 
evaluative talk is both variable and rhetorically organized.  
On the other, a wide range of social psychological research is 
produced that both presupposes and finds evidence of enduring 
underlying attitudes.  One explanation for this may be that, 
on some occasions at least, the results of attitude research 
are a consequence of procedures that restrict and refine from 
everyday evaluative practices in a way that ensures the 
‘discovery’ of underlying attitudes.  This paper explores this 
explanation in one domain where there is a major practical 
concern with attitudes and opinions, namely market research 
focus groups.  Detailed analysis of transcripts of 8 market 
research focus groups identifies three procedures that 
moderators use to produce freestanding opinion packages: (a) 
they display rhetorically embedded evaluations as 
inconsequential; (b) they provide formal guidance for 
participants to produce freestanding opinions; (c) they 
formulate participants’ talk as freestanding opinions, 
stripping off rhetorical elements.  The findings are supported 
by considering deviant cases.  This illustrates one way in 
which evaluations are transformed into freestanding attitudes.  
More broadly contributes to a body of work that studies how 
social science methods work in practice. 
Introduction 
Over the last decade a discursive social psychological 
approach has been developed in parallel to more established 
social psychological perspectives.  Discursive social 
psychology (henceforth DSP) is the application of ideas from 
discourse analysis to issues in social psychology.  Its 
publication record stretches back through the 80s where 
empirical, theoretical and conceptual arguments were developed 
in both discourse and rhetoric research (e.g. Billig, 1985; 
Billig, 1996 [1987]; Litton and Potter, 1985; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987).  Since then these strands of work have 
largely merged together, drawing on work in conversation 
analysis (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Sacks, 1992), and 
tackling topics in both social and cognitive psychology 
(Antaki, 1994; Edwards, 1991, 1997; Edwards and Potter, 1992, 
1993; Potter & Edwards, forthcoming; Wetherell and Potter, 
1992).   
In this paper we will push this argument forward using 
the topic of attitudes and opinions.  This is a topic that has 
marked out DSP from social cognition and other traditional 
approaches.  DSP has provided both a critique of tradition 
conceptualizations of attitudes (Billig, 1996 [1987], 1988, 
1989; Burningham, 1995; Potter and Wetherell, 1987, 1988; 
Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Wetherell, et al., 1987) and a 
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respecification in terms of evaluative practices and 
orientations (Potter, 1998; Myers, 1998; Verkuyten, 1998).  
Put simply, DSP studies documenting both the variation and 
rhetorical organization of evaluations present problems for 
social cognition and other traditional accounts of attitudes; 
while studies of the pragmatics of evaluations suggest new 
ways of understanding their role in people’s practices. 
Such DSP studies, however, throw up a paradox.  How can 
they be reconciled with the wide range of research that both 
presupposes and finds evidence of enduring underlying 
attitudes?  After all, attitudes continue to figure in a very 
large number of social psychological studies and continue to 
be viewed as one of its most indispensable concepts (Manstead, 
1995).  One possible way of making sense of this paradox is to 
consider the connection of method and theory.  Could the sorts 
of methods of attitude research that have been used restrict 
the appearance of evaluative variation and exclude evidence of 
the rhetorical organization of evaluations?  Arguments of this 
kind have been made with respect to Likert scales and other 
quantitative measurement techniques (Billig, et al., 1988; 
Potter, 1998; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). 
In this study we consider an area of psychological 
research where qualitative studies of attitudes are 
commonplace, namely market research.  In particular, we will 
consider the use of focus groups that are now widely used as a 
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way of ‘eliciting’ people’s opinions, attitudes and beliefs 
about products, policies and services.  Our interest will be 
in the way evaluations are treated, and particularly how they 
are produced as ‘freestanding opinion packages’.  That is, how 
they are treated as bundled packets that can be listed, 
counted, and passed from one to another.   
Focus groups are structured around an interactional 
dilemma (Puchta, 1999; Puchta and Potter, 1999; cf. Billig et 
al., 1988).  On the one hand, focus group participants are 
asked to ‘always say,=whatever comes to mind’ (see extract 
above). On the other, participants seem to be carefully 
policed into ‘what exactly comes to mind’.  In this study we 
will investigate the procedures that focus group moderators 
use for discovering the traditional notion of opinion within 
participants, while overtly eliciting it from them.   
The Discursive Psychology of Evaluation 
In traditional social psychology attitudes are treated as 
having a number of core features.  They are:  
(a) located within the individual (and are perceptible as 
subjective experiences);  
(b) these internal states can be observed in verbal, 
behavioural or physiological reactions;  
(c) they are (generally) static;  
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(d) individuals differ regarding their evaluative reactions; 
and  
(e) these reactions can be measured by attitude scales.  
Let us be cautious in what we are claiming.  There is now 
a wide range of more or less subtle and complex theorizations 
of attitudes in the social cognition literature (see, for 
example, studies discussed in Eagly and Chaiken, 1993).  
Elsewhere we have discussed some of these theoretical 
complications (e.g. Potter, 1998).  However, our concern in 
this paper is with the broad sweep of social psychological 
research, including research done in marketing contexts, that 
uses attitude measures without necessarily being concerned 
with potential theoretical nuances and respecifications.  We 
take it that most readers will recognise the core features 
listed above as characteristic of studies that apply attitude 
notions to particular topics.  
This traditional notion has been reworked from a 
discourse and rhetorical perspective.  The rhetorical nature 
of attitudes is stressed by Billig (1988, 1989, 1991, 1992) 
who claims that, rather than carry attitudes around as fixed 
entities, people: 
 give views in particular contexts; 
 produce evaluations where there is at least the possibility 
of argument (they tend not to argue about the virtues of 
gravitational force); 
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 while expressing an evaluation for something, and marking 
the justification of their own position, often 
simultaneously express criticisms against the counter-
position.  
Whereas Billig stresses that attitudes are rhetorically 
occasioned and are therefore inextricable from the arguments 
in which they occur, Potter & Wetherell (1987; Potter, 1998) 
have drawn attention to what people are doing by making 
evaluations (or displaying a lack of evaluation) in particular 
settings.  Both Billig and Potter & Wetherell highlight 
variations in evaluations as evidence critical of traditional 
research.  The point is here that evaluations are not treated 
as ready-made cognitive objects, but as entities that are 
worked up by the participants in ways that are suitable for 
what is being done (compliments and complaints, persuading 
people against courses of action, and so on).  
In this paper our interest will be in whether the conduct 
of focus groups will involve particular interactional 
practices to strip off these rhetorical and performative 
elements of evaluative talk.  That is, we will ask whether 
focus group practices obscure precisely those features of 
evaluations that distinguish DSP and traditional approaches. 
Before moving to this, however, there are some 
terminological issues that need to be tackled to prevent 
confusion.  Social psychologists have sometimes distinguished 
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the term ‘attitude’ from ‘opinion’, reserving the former for 
underlying evaluative positions and the latter for verbal 
statements of those positions.  This distinction is plausible 
when making certain traditional assumptions, but it is not 
used consistently in the market research we are studying.  
Moreover, even traditional researchers find it hard to sustain 
consistently in practice.  On the one hand, for example, 
popular recent definitions of attitude (such as Zanna & 
Rempel, 1988) define attitudes as ‘evaluative categorizations’ 
(starting to blur the distinction between evaluation and 
action) and attitudes are anyway typically (although not 
always) operationalized in research studies in terms of 
discourse activities (‘verbal responses’).  On the other hand, 
research on people’s ‘opinions’ is rarely concerned with 
verbal statements as such (how they are occasioned, what they 
are doing); in practice ‘public opinion’ is treated as an 
underlying variable much like attitudes are treated in social 
psychology (see, for example, Curtice & Jowell, 1996). 
Researchers using focus groups, and discussing focus 
group methodology, sometimes compound this terminological 
blurring by describing focus groups as concerned with POBAs – 
an acronym that brings together a deliberately fuzzy set of 
notions: Perspectives, Opinions, Beliefs and Attitudes (see 
Puchta, 1999).  From our DSP perspective, the analytic topic 
is ‘evaluative practices’ (assessments in discourse and their 
various uses), so we are neither committed to the terms 
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‘attitude’ and ‘opinion’, nor to producing a technical 
demarcation between them.  Our expectation is that there will 
be a wide variety of uses of evaluations and the available 
meta-language may capture some better than others. 
Focus groups and interaction 
Focus groups derive their results from interaction and 
are participant centred.  This is emphasised in the various 
books that are available giving guidance on the proper conduct 
of focus groups (e.g. Krueger, 1998; Morgan, 1997).  It is 
also typically emphasised by the group moderator (the 
researcher who is present and guides and oversees the group).  
For example, this extract is taken from the moderator’s 
introductory remarks at the start of a focus group: 
It would be nice, (.) ((clears her throat)) all in all, 
(1.0) if we could have a >so-called< group-discussion, 
if we could really get into a discussion,=and I don't 
want to interrogate,=and I certainly don't want to 
test you, (.) and it's not about knowledge, but about 
opinions, >you just always say,=whatever comes to mind, 
(.) and there are< no, (.) right or wrong answers. 
Note the way the contrast is built between knowledge and 
opinion, and how participants are encouraged to avoid treating 
answers as right or wrong.   
The relationship between interaction and the ‘results’ of 
market focus groups is quite complex.  The companies who 
commission the group (in this case typically concerned with 
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extending the line of a particular brand of cigarette) pay for 
three kinds of output.  They may have a representative who 
watches the interaction from behind a one-way mirror; they 
will be given a video of the interaction; they will be given a 
report of the interaction written by the moderator (which 
typically summarises themes and gives sample quotes of 
people’s ‘views’).  None of these forms of output takes 
priority over the others.  This means that the moderator is a 
central part of the data production.  He or she can, for 
example, display the importance of something by showing 
attention to it or visibly ignoring it.  This will be apparent 
to the client whether through the one-way mirror or on the 
video, or in what is quoted in the report. 
Our general question is how is it that moderators can 
work with this material, which according to DSP ought to 
contain evaluations which are variable and rhetorically 
organized, and can nevertheless manage to pick out attitudes 
and opinions as decontextualized and freestanding entities in 
the course of the interaction? 
It will help avoid confusion here if we note that there 
are two notions of interaction in play.  On the one hand, 
there is a traditional social psychological notion of 
interaction that considers people as owning memories, beliefs 
and attitudes and considers interaction as an arena in which 
those things are expressed and communicated.  In DSP, on the 
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other hand, interaction is treated as a set of occasioned 
practices where evaluations may be developed and undermined, 
often built contrastively for ongoing arguments, and where 
they may sometimes be constituted as ‘attitudes’ or ‘beliefs’ 
tied to individuals.   
Note that DSP does not claim that people do not, on 
occasion, avow personal opinions or construct their talk in 
the language of freestanding attitudes.  What distinguishes 
DSP from traditional alternatives is how such avowals are 
understood (broadly, as actions rather than as indexes of 
underlying dispositions).  This means that the empirical 
phenomena that are most consequential theoretically involve 
situations where evaluations are rhetorically constructed.  
These are therefore what will focus on in this paper.  And our 
interest will be in how such phenomena are handled 
methodologically.  That is, how do moderators deal with the 
rhetorical finessing of argumentation, and in particular how, 
if at all, do they re-package such formulations into 
freestanding entities?  We will also be concerned with 
evidence that moderators train participants that freestanding 
opinions are appropriate to produce in focus groups. 
Conversation Analysis of institutions and social research 
In this study we have drawn heavily on the theoretical 
assumptions and analytic perspective of Conversation Analysis.  
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Let us indicate how we have done this and why.  One of the 
main assumptions of Conversation Analysis (henceforth CA) is 
that contributions to interaction are contextually oriented.  
Heritage suggests that talk in interaction is both ‘context 
shaped and context renewing’ (1984:242).  That is, a speaker’s 
contribution is both designed with regard to the local 
configuration of activity and in particular the immediately 
preceding actions, and itself inevitably contributes to the 
framework in terms of which the next action will be 
understood.  This is a dynamic view that considers context not 
as given, but as an active accomplishment.  CA makes a break 
from conventional approaches of institutional settings that 
adopt a ‘container’ model of institutional contexts (Heritage, 
1987) and instead emphasises the way participants orient to, 
and constitute the nature of institutional interaction (Drew 
and Heritage, 1992).   
Recently CA workers have started to apply this 
perspective to the process of social research itself.  For 
example, Suchman and Jordan (1990) and Schaeffer and Maynard 
(1996) have studied interactional processes in survey 
interviews, Antaki and Rapley (1996; Rapley and Antaki, 1996) 
have studied the administration of a quality of life 
questionnaire, and Myers and Macnaghten (Myers, 1998; Myers 
and Macnaghten, 1999) has considered the management of focus 
group interaction.  These studies identify generic 
organizational problems that appear in research methods such 
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as interviews and focus groups, and study the organized 
solution to them (see also Schegloff, 1990).  One way of 
conceptualizing our current study is as a contribution to this 
literature on interaction in social research, which has a 
particular concern with the way participants manage the task 
of producing opinions out of interaction. 
Research questions 
Our research questions are stimulated by the contrast 
between the claims of DSP about the rhetorical and 
performative nature of evaluative talk and the presence of a 
large body of focus group market research that purports to 
work with and identify individual attitudes and opinions.  In 
particular, we will address the following questions. 
 How do moderators deal with interaction between participants 
in which opinions may be rhetorically developed?   
 How do moderators use meta-formulations to encourage 
freestanding evaluations? 
 What procedures are used to strip off the rhetorically 
embedded nature of evaluations?   
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Method 
Analytic materials 
Videotapes of eight focus group tapes run by six 
different moderators were the analytic basis for this study.  
The groups were mainly conducted to give advertising people 
and product managers the possibility to, in their terms, 
‘experience the experience’ of smokers (from behind a one-way-
mirror).  Such groups are routinely video-recorded.  Tapes 
were selected to satisfying the following criteria:  
  They used a range of different moderators; 
  All the moderators where highly experienced (this 
was their full time occupation), although they 
varied in their skill (judged by the head of the 
market research department); 
  Some of the groups covered broad and some narrow 
topics. 
These criteria were chosen to facilitate generalization 
from the findings. 
Each focus group lasted for ninety minutes or more; the 
number of participants varied from seven to eleven.  We 
transcribed two focus groups from beginning to end, segments 
of thirty minutes from six focus groups and the opening 
sequence from every focus group, making altogether more than 
Manufacturing Individual Opinions 13 
six hours of transcribed talk.  Further transcript was made 
from the video as needed.  Out of six moderators in the 
materials four were male and two were female; this broadly 
reflects current employment patterns in the area.  In all 
groups, about half of the participants were female.  As 
participants are chosen to reflect the target group of the 
discussed cigarette brand, only one focus group consisted of 
middle-aged participants, all the others consisted of 'young' 
smokers - from the age of eighteen until about twenty-eight. 
Transcription and translation 
The focus groups were conducted in German.  They were 
transcribed in German and these transcripts translated into 
English; a bilingual English speaker checked all translations.  
The analysis was done on the German original, but for 
presentation purposes we will work primarily with the English 
translation.  We discussed from case to case, how best to 
transfer pauses and characteristics of speech production such 
as emphasized sounds from the German original to the English 
translation. 
All cigarette brands talked about in the groups have been 
pseudonomized by naming them after capital cities.  
Participants are named P1, P2 etc.; the moderator is Mod..   
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Standard Jeffersonian transcription conventions have been 
used throughout (see Ten Have, 1998, for a recent summary).  
The principle conventions are as follows. 
He Underlining indicates stress or emphasis. 
(0.8)Numbers in parantheses indicate periods of silence, in 
tenths of a second. Pauses under 0.5 seconds have not 
been timed and are shown as (.). 
() Parentheses indicate talk difficult to transcribe. Words 
inside such parentheses indicate the transcriber's best 
estimate of what is being said. 
[] Left-side brackets indicate where overlapping talk 
begins; right-side brackets where overlapping talk ends. 
= Equal signs indicate a 'latched' relationship without any 
silence. 
 Talk appearing within degree signs is lower in volume 
relative to surrounding talk. 
>< 'Greater than' and 'less than' symbols enclose talk that 
is noticeably faster than the surrounding talk. 
, Commas are a ‘continuation’ marker, indicating that the 
speaker has not finished; marked by fall-rise or weak 
rising intonation, as when enunciating lists. 
? Question marks signal ‘questioning’ intonation, 
irrespective of grammar. 
. Periods (full stops) mark falling, stopping intonation 
(‘final contour’), irrespective of grammar, and not 
necessarily followed by a pause. 
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Various features taken from the video (bodily 
orientation, writing, non-vocal activities such as opening and 
holding up cigarette packets) are noted on the transcripts, as 
they become relevant for the analysis. 
Analytic Procedure 
The materials were analysed using techniques from CA and 
DSP (Drew, 1995; Heritage, 1997; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; 
Potter, 1996, 1997; Potter & Edwards, forthcoming; Ten Have, 
1998).  Rather than attempt to code and categorize the 
materials, the focus is on the situated nature and action 
orientation of participants’ talk.  Participants’ own 
orientations are used as a principle resource for making sense 
of interaction (if participants treat something as an 
invitation, say, that is powerful grounds for the analyst 
treating it in this way).  In this case, we are particularly 
concerned with the orientations displayed by the moderators 
when participants display evaluations in freestanding or 
rhetorically embedded ways.  Analysis of this kind is at least 
partly a craft skill and therefore not easy to turn into a 
specific recipe.  However, carefully transcribed examples of 
the original materials are presented along side the 
interpretations to allow readers and reviewers to judge the 
adequacy of claims. 
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In the analysis we have mainly chosen to present one 
instance of each of the phenomena we are concerned with.  This 
is a compromise between journal space and reader patience, on 
the one hand, and allowing the reader the option to assess our 
analysis of a range of examples, on the other (further 
examples and analyses are available in Puchta, 1999).  Our 
analysis is concerned with identifying a normative pattern 
rather than a general statistical association, so our analysis 
of potential deviant cases is particular important for 
supporting the adequacy of our claims. 
Analysis 
1. Rhetorical construction and moderator recipiency 
Let us start with a relatively coarse grained observation 
about moderator recipiency.  The moderators in our sample 
display attention (that is, visibly attend) to freestanding 
opinion formulations and display disattention to (explicitly) 
rhetorically embedded formulations.  In Figure One the talk is 
schematically summarized rather than directly transcribed to 
highlight this pattern of interaction.  The arrows indicate to 
whom speakers address their contributions (shown by posture 
and gaze).  
Insert Figure One about here. 
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Asked to describe a cigarette’s taste the participants 
P1, P3, P4, P5 and P6 initially report assessments directly to 
the moderators (there are two moderators in this focus group) 
and the moderators take notes. However, participants P3, P4 
and P5 then address comments to each other (see circles V and 
VI).  The point of interest here is that the moderators do not 
write down these comments. In VII P2 redirects interaction to 
the moderator with his comment: 
Well I'll stick to it. 
This not only receives an explicit receipt from the 
moderator (‘Hm mm,’), but is also written down.  The contrast 
here, then, is in the moderators differential attention to 
contextually and rhetorically formulated contributions such as 
‘No, I don’t think so’ (see circle V) and freestanding 
individual opinions such as ‘Well I’ll stick to it’ (circle 
VII). 
This example is a useful start-point as it illustrates 
the kind of phenomena of interest.  However, what is going on 
is often more subtle than this.  In the following 3 sections 
we will look at techniques that moderators use to head off 
interaction between participants with its associated 
rhetorical construction of evaluations and to formulate 
freestanding opinion packages from rhetorically organized 
talk.   
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2. Displaying inconsequentiality 
One of the most straightforward techniques for displaying 
the inconsequentiality of rhetorically embedded evaluations is 
to ignore them.  This is seen in the interaction patterns 
above.  Let us consider an example in detail.   
The following extract comes from a focus group where the 
participants are discussing the name for a new cigarette 
brand. ‘Cape Blue Ultra’ is the proposed name for a planned 
light line extender (lower tar version) of the stronger 
‘mother brand’ ‘Cape’; the Cape Blue Ultra packet is blue, the 
Cape packet is red. 
(2) Source: Blue17,919; file: diagra1a; video: 27:11 
 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Mod. What do the others 
think? (1.0) What kind 
of a name is this? (1.3) 
Or, (1.1) how do you 
like it? (.8) Or what do 
you associate with it? 
 Was meinen die andern? 
(1.0) Was ist das fürn 
Name? (1.3) Oder, (1.1) 
wie findet Ihr den? (.8) 
Oder was fällt Euch dazu 
ein? 
  13 lines omitted 
 20 
21  
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
P1 =That says absolutely 
nothing to me at all. 
(.8) Ultra, okay, well I 
can, (.) consider, 
whether it is (.) light, 
or, (.) especially 
strong, or whatever, 
but, (.6) blue is 
totally without a 
statement, I think. 
 =da kann ich mir 
überhaupt nichts mehr 
drunter vorstellen. (.8) 
Ultra, okay, da kann 
ich, (.) mir noch 
überlegen, ob das nun 
(.) leicht, oder, (.) 
besonders schwer is, 
oder sonst was, aber, 
(.6) blue hat irgendwie 
überhaupt keine Aussage, 
find ich. 
 31 
32 
33 
34 
P2 (>Well,<) perhaps it is 
called blue purposely to 
set it apart from the 
red ones. 
addresses 
P1 
(>Ja,<) vielleicht 
heisst die blue extra, 
um die von den roten 
abzusetzen. 
  12 lines omitted 
 47 
48 
49 
50 
P3 Well, then it ought to 
say on the, (.) blue- 
(.) on the red one, (.) 
red. 
 Ja, dann müsste ja bei 
der, (.) blau- (.) bei 
der roten, (.) müsste 
red draufstehen. 
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 51 (.8)    
 52 
53 
P2 Yes, what I'm saying is 
>it's automatically<= 
addresses 
P3 
Ja, aber ich mein >die 
ist ja nun automatisch<= 
 54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
P3 =Red strong. (.) or 
(so,) (.) (red 
strong,) (1.2) Then 
there would be some sort 
of, (.) se, (.) quence 
again, (xxxxxx) 
addresses 
P2 
=Red strong. (.) oder 
(so,) (.) (red 
strong,) (1.2) Dann 
würde das wieder sone, 
(.) sone, (.) 
Reihenfolge ergeben, 
(xxxxxx) 
 61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
P2 But I mean the Cape is 
already on the market, 
(.) u:h,=u:h, (.) 
before, (.) >well< all 
these, (.) Ultra or the 
Lights started. (1.5) 
the Cape was then 
already in existence in 
the normal packet. (1.1) 
And perhaps to set if 
apart, (.) from them a 
bit, (.) it was called 
Blue Ultra. 
addresses 
P3 
Aber ich mein die Cape 
ist ja schon auf dem 
Markt. (.) e:h,=e:h, (.) 
bevor, (.) >also< die 
ganzen, (.) Ultra oder 
die Lights auch 
angefangen sind. (1.5) 
da gabs die Cape ja 
schon in der normalen 
Packung. (1.1) Und um 
sie davon, (.) 
vielleicht etwas 
abzusetzen, (.) hiess es 
Blue Ultra. 
  7 lines omitted 
 81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
Mod. Well presu:mably, (.) 
someone did indeed, have 
something in mind here, 
and if you would just 
try to, (.) put 
yourself, in their 
place, ((continues)) 
 Also vorau:ssichtlich, 
(.) war es schon so, 
dass irgendjemand sich 
was dabei gedacht hat, 
und wenn Ihr einfach mal 
versuchen solltet, Euch 
da, (.) reinzuversetzen, 
((fährt fort)) 
 
Without going to far into the complexities of this 
extract, what we wish to concentrate on are the arguments put 
forward in particular by P1 against the usefulness of the name 
(‘blue is totally without a statement, I think.’; lines 27-9) 
and P2's defence of the brand name: ‘(>Well,<) perhaps it is 
called blue purposely to set it apart from the red ones.’ 
(lines 31-4).  P2 thus offers an argument for calling the 
brand 'Cape Blue Ultra'.  When P3 rejects this by pointing 
out, that, following his argument, the Cape in the red packet 
should be called 'the red Cape', P2 claims, that this argument 
is a theoretical one, as the original Cape was introduced a 
long time before light cigarette brands have been on the 
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market. The moderator then asks, or, more precisely, gives a 
‘directive as a question substitute’ (Heritage and Roth, 
1995): 
Well presu:mably, (.) someone did indeed, have something 
in mind here, and if you would just try to, (.) put 
yourself, in their place, ((continues))(lines 81-7). 
Note the way that the moderator avoids acknowledging P2's 
argument.  In emphasising that someone did have something in 
mind in giving the line extender the name 'Cape Blue Ultra' 
she implies, that up to then nobody in the group ‘had 
something in mind’ and urges the group members to put 
themselves 'in their place'.  Although the moderator has 
tolerated talk between participants, she displays it as 
inconsequential. 
The general point, then, is the way that the moderator 
encourages participants to produce freestanding opinions by 
ignoring opinions that are produced in discussion between 
participants.  This displayed disattention will be available 
to the observer using the one-way mirror, of course, as it is 
on the video.  
3. Meta requests for freestanding opinion talk 
Sometimes moderators ‘go meta’.  That is, they provide 
explicit formulations of the kind of contributions that are 
welcome (cf. Simons, 1989).  These formulations do not 
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explicitly ask for freestanding opinions; however, they 
provide examples where this feature is apparent.  
Consider the following extract.  It revolves around a so-
called projective question concerning the features of a 
typical smoker of the brand London. 
(3) Source: London,596; file: eviden3; video: 33:04 
 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Mod. ((continues)) What, (.) 
well, (.) other 
characteristics 
does=does he have,=how 
does he live, (.) 
DESCRIBE HIM as one (.) 
could uh=imagine him .hh 
in a role in a=in a film 
(.) or=or in a  
[book or,         ]  
 ((fährt fort)) Was, (.) 
so, (.) hat=hat er noch 
für Eigenschaften,=wie 
lebt er so, (.) 
BESCHREIBEN SIE ihn ma 
so wie man sich den .hh 
inner Rolle inm=inm Kino 
(.) eh=vorstellen könnte 
(.) (oder=oder im  
[Buch oder,)] 
 11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
P1 [Well, at any rate] down 
to earth, >because< he 
is also sensitive, (.7) 
creative, 
 [Also halt auf jeden 
Fall        ] 
bodenständig, >weil 
halt< auch sensibel, 
(.7) kreativ, 
 16 (1.1)    
 17 Mod. Hm mm,  Hm mm, 
 18 (1.6)    
 19 P2 Hedo[nist,    ]  Genuss[mensch,  ] 
 20 
21 
P1     [Educated,] yes, addresses 
P2 
      [Gebildet,] ja, 
 22 
23 
P3 Yes, addresses 
P2 
Ja, 
 24 P2 Likes eating out,  Geht gerne essen, 
 25 
26 
P1 Yes, addresses 
P2 
Ja, 
 27 
28 
P3 (xxxxx)= addresses 
P2 
(xxxxx)= 
 29 
30 
Mod. =Yes, EVERYBODY IS 
ALLOWED [TO  ]= 
 =Ja, JEDER DARF SEINEN 
[EIGENEN]= 
 31 P1         [Yes,]=  [Ja,    ]= 
 32 
33 
Mod. =describe his own.=now 
[don't lets talk] 
 =beschreiben.=jetzt 
[reden wir mal nicht] 
 34 
35 
36 
37 
P1 [Educated,      ] (.) 
and well also a 
hedonist, that's it 
[(now) ] 
 [Gebildet,          ] 
(.) und halt auch nen 
Genussmensch, das wars 
dann halt [(auch)  ] 
 38 
39 
40 
41 
Mod. [Hedo-,] okay, yes, 
that's already pretty 
vivid ((continues)) 
 
addresses 
P4 
          [Genuss-,] 
okay, ja, das ist ja 
schon ma ganz plastisch, 
((fährt fort)) 
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The notable thing here is that when P1, P2 and P3 begin a 
joint description of the typical smoker of London cigarettes, 
the moderator shouts emphatically:  
=Yes, EVERYBODY IS ALLOWED [TO  ]= 
P1:                        [Yes,]= 
=describe his own.=now [don't lets talk] (lines 29-33). 
The turn is left hearably incomplete, but participants 
would be expected to be able to project it as ‘don't lets all 
talk at once’ (the incompleteness here might lessen the effect 
of telling the participants off).  The moderator goes meta in 
the sense that he explicitly offers a rule on how to provide 
contributions: everybody has the right to describe his/her 
'own typical smoker'.  It is notable that after this turn the 
participants return their focus to the moderator, addressing 
their contributions to him.  Thus P1 elaborates on her own 
projective smoker, and produces it as a freestanding 
description addressed to the moderator: 
[Educated,] (.) and well also a hedonist, that's it 
[(now)] (lines 34-7). 
The moderator acknowledges and confirms the description 
(‘[Hedo-,] okay, yes, that's already pretty vivid’; lines 38-
40).  
Note the way the detail of the interaction is in line 
with our general account.  P1's description in 34-7 is more or 
less a combination of her own and P2’s earlier contributions 
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(P2 has provided ‘He[donist,]’ (line 19) and P1 ‘[Educated,] 
yes,’ (line 20)).  When the three participants produce 
contributions linked by agreement tokens (‘yes’) these are 
queried by the moderator.  However, when a participant 
formulates very similar contributions as a freestanding 
opinion, and when it is addressed to the moderator, the 
opinion is not only accepted but also praised.  The general 
observation here is that the moderator’s intervention with a 
meta observation about the conduct of the participants leads 
to the production of a freestanding opinion package. 
So far we have considered how the moderators deal with 
rhetorically oriented opinion production by ignoring it or 
making explicit injunctions against it.  We will now consider 
another approach, which is for moderators to ‘strip off’ the 
rhetorical elements and thereby formulate freestanding opinion 
packages.   
4. Stripping off the rhetorical context 
Let us consider an example of stripping off rhetorical 
context.  This is an exercise where the moderator asks which 
brands the participants would place near the light cigarette 
brand Stansted
1
 in a hypothetical shelf. 
(4) Source: Hensted7,932; file: echo53; video: 29:30;  
 1 
2 
Mod. ((continues)) imagine,=>you go 
and stand in front of a 
((fährt fort)) stellen Sie 
sich vor,=>Sie stellen sich 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
gigantic,< (.) u:h, (.6) 
she:lf, (.) with only 
cigarette brands on it. (1.0) 
Which brands would you place 
(.) near the Stansted. 
vor nen riesigen,< (.) e:h, 
(.6) Rega:l, (.) nur 
Zigarettenmarken drauf. (1.0) 
Welche Marken würdense (.) zu 
der Stansted stellen. 
  29 lines omitted 
 37 
38 
39 
40 
P1 ((continues)) because I would 
just mechanically sort them 
according to the contents 
labels,2 
((fährt fort)) weil ich würd 
einfach stur nach den Werten 
sortieren, 
 41 
42 
Mod. After the contents labels um 
mm,= 
Nach Werten hm mm,= 
 43 
44 
45 
P1 =I would do it just 
mechanically according to the 
contents labels= 
=Einfach stur nach den Werten 
würde ich gehen= 
 46 P2 Well I [(xxxxxxxxx)  ] =Also ich [(xxxxxxxxx)] 
 47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
P1        [Without first] ev- 
looking at the packet, so then 
exactly as is the case 
>somehow< in the tobacco shop 
too, 
          [Ohne zuerst] (je-) 
auf die Packung zu gucken, 
also genau wies im Tabakladen 
>irgendwie< auch der Fall ist, 
  21 lines omitted 
 73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
P2 ((continues)) product wants to 
position itself, then on no 
account next to other light 
products, (.8) but certainly 
next to the Heathrow,=then the 
(.) loyal Heathrow smokers, 
who have perhaps, (.) kind of 
an irritated throat anyhow, 
.hh say "Oh, then I'll just 
try its younger brother" (.) 
so to speak, 
((fährt fort)) Produkt sich 
selbst plazieren will, dann 
doch auf gar keinen Fall 
neben anderen Light-Produkten, 
(.8) sondern auf jeden Fall 
neben der Heathrow,=dann die 
(.) treuen Heathrow Raucher, 
die vielleicht mal nen 
bisschen, (.) Kratzen im Hals 
haben sowieso, .hh sagn “Oh, 
dann nehm ich doch mal den 
kleinen Bruder (.) davon” 
sozusagen,  
  36 lines omitted 
 121 
122 
P3 But I find, that you= Ich find aber schon, dass Du 
den= 
 123 
124 
125 
Mod. =(A moment) the Stansted would 
then be the younger brother of 
the Heathrow. 
=(Halt mal) also die Stansted 
wär der kleinere Bruder der 
Heathrow. 
 
Near the start of the sequence P1 stresses he would 
categorize brands ‘mechanically’ according to ‘labels’ (lines 
37-40).  During P1’s turn the moderator orients his attention 
to other participants and P2 starts to come in.  However, P1 
continues displaying his opinion.  P2 then presents his 
opinion in using an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986; 
Edwards, in press):  
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on no account next to other light products, (lines 74-
6). 
He constructs his argument as a counter-argument to P1 
and stresses that the very light Stansted should be positioned 
next to the less light Heathrow, so that Heathrow smokers with 
an ‘irritated throat’ (line 80) might say: ‘"Oh, then I'll 
just try its younger brother"’ (lines 81-2). 
Now comes the phenomenon of interest.  At the end of P2’s 
long turn, a third participant (P3) tries to gain the floor, 
but is interrupted by the moderator: 
=(A moment) the Stansted would then be the younger 
brother of the Heathrow. (lines 123-5) 
The moderator formulates an element of P2’s talk which 
has been used to undermine P1’s argument (see Heritage, 1985).  
What we see, then, is that the moderator picks out an argument 
used to support a particular position and presents it as a 
freestanding thing.  The general point here is that when 
participants produce evaluative talk, which develops explicit 
rhetorical contrasts, these can be removed to leave the 
evaluations as freestanding entities tied to individuals. 
In our corpus there is, however, evidence that there is a 
conversational environment in which the production of non-
freestanding opinion displays is tolerated, that is, attended 
to, and formulated as focus group relevant.  In our final 
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section we will attend to such deviant cases and consider 
their implications for our general claims. 
5. Deviant cases 
Up to now we have claimed that moderators in market 
research focus groups display a preference for individual 
opinions in the form of freestanding packages.  They 
systematically ignore rhetorically developed opinions, or 
explicitly offer ‘rules’ against their use, or they formulate 
such opinions with their rhetorical elements stripped off. 
However, there are certain occasions where agreement tokens 
are tolerated as rhetorically formulated contributions.  These 
are particularly interesting as potential cases which might 
raise problems for the sorts of pattern we have identified, or 
which allow us to refine our claims.  In this section we will 
look more closely at the environment in which such sequences 
are embedded.  
The following extract revolves around discussion of the 
'typical smoker' of Cape Blue Ultras.  The moderator is 
following up on a participant’s description, asking her 
whether the 'typical smoker' is a man or a woman. 
(5) Source: Blue17,334; file: eviden7; video: 12:13 
 1 
2 
3 
4 
Mod. Hm mm, (.) this was 
already a very vivid 
description,=was it a 
man or a woman, (.) in 
 Hm mm, (.) das war schon 
ne sehr plastische 
Beschreibung,=eher Mann 
oder Frau, (.) Deiner 
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5 your opinion? Meinung nach? 
 6 P1 Doesn't matter.  Das ist egal. 
 7 Mod. Doesn't matter,=  Das ist egal,= 
 8 P1 =Hm mm,=  =Hm mm,= 
 9 
10 
P2 =I'd say, probably a 
woman. 
 =Ich würd sagen, eher 
Frau. 
 11 P3 Me too,  Ich auch, 
 12 many (Me too,)
3  (Ich auch,) 
 13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Mod. Why? makes a 
'funny' 
attempt to 
address 
all, who 
said ‘Me 
too,’ 
Warum? 
 20 
21 
22 
P3 Because women, (.) are 
usually (.) [light] 
smokers, 
 Weil Frauen, (.) eher, 
(.) [Light]raucher sind, 
 23 P2             [Yes, ]      [Ja,  ] 
 24 Mod. Hm mm,  Hm mm, 
 25 
26 
(1.6)  mod. takes 
notes 
 
 27 
28 
29 
30 
P3 But those in love, (.) 
with life, (.) I too I 
ththink,  
mod. 
continues 
taking 
notes 
Aber so die lebens, (.) 
lustig, (.) ffind ich 
auch, 
 
In response to the moderator's question at the start of 
the extract P1 says the gender of the imaginary smoker does 
not matter.  This is immediately contradicted by P2: ‘=I'd 
say, probably a woman.’ (lines 9-10). P3 supports P2 (‘Me 
too,’; line 11) and several other participants join in and 
signal their approval.  The moderator makes a hearably and 
visibly humorous attempt to address this group of participants 
and asks for their reason for the judgement (line 13).  What 
is interesting here, is the way that the 'me too-advocates' 
are treated as a single entity with a collective view.  Unlike 
other interactions, they are not asked to describe their 
individual judgements 'in their own words'.   
How can we account for this deviant case?  We suggest 
that it marks out a distinction between qualitative opinions 
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and categorical judgements.  Think of the difference between 
the question ‘do you smoke Marlboro?’ which can be answered 
with a yes or no, and ‘what is it about Marlboro that you 
like?’ that would require you to specify some qualities or 
attributes.  In the former case, agreement token are readily 
interpretable as placing participants in a category; while in 
the latter case they leave the association of particular 
participants with individual qualities opaque or ambiguous. 
Let us take a further case to explore this.  While 
Extract 5 involved a categorical judgement about gender, the 
moderator in the next extract asks for a numerical judgement: 
how long does one need when one tries a new brand, until 
one, (.6) <comes to a reasonably satisfactory conclusion 
about it,> (lines 1-5) 
Note the way the moderator again accepts again agreement-
tokens (line 29). 
(6) Source: Blue19,773; file: eviden6; video: 46:16 
 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Mod. By the way how long does one 
need when one tries a new 
brand, until one, (.6) <comes 
to a reasonably satisfactory 
conclusion about it,>  
Wie lange braucht man 
eigentlich wenn man sone neue 
Marke probiert, bis man so, 
(.6) <einigermassen für sich 
nen stimmiges Urteil hat,> 
  11 lines omitted 
 17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
P1 (It's) about half a packet, 
or, at least three or four 
should >then< I think 
certainly, (.7)  
[well for me (at least xxxxx)] 
(Des is) sone halbe Packung, 
oder, zumindest drei vier 
Stück sollten >dann< glaub ich 
schon, (.7) 
[also brauch ich (zumindest 
xxxxx)]    
 23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
P2 [Well but this really depends] 
(.) >(well)< there really are 
brands, from which I take two 
pulls 
(and find them  
[kind of disgusting)] 
[Also das kommt echt darauf an                  
      ] (.) >(also)< es gibt 
echt Marken, da rauch ich zwei 
Züge 
(und find sie  
[eigentlich widerlich)] 
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 29 many [(Yes,
4             ] [Ja,                  ] 
 30 
31 
P1 (Also.) (.8) but with this one 
I wouldn't know, 
(Auch.) (.8) aber bei dieser 
wüsst ichs jetzt nicht, 
 32 
33 
34 
P2 
+ 
some 
No,5 Nee, 
 35 (2.3)   
 36 
37 
Mod. And what would you assume 
((continues)) 
Und was würdest Du vermuten 
((fährt fort)) 
 
Let us highlight two features of this sequence.  First, 
the question is unusual in asking for a number of some kind 
(‘how long’) rather than for a qualitative opinion.  Second, 
the answers are organized contrastively (three or four 
cigarettes vs. two pulls vs. don’t know).  Although this is 
not quite as simple as the previous case, the continuum is 
chunked into three categories.  It is these categorical claims 
that receive the unqualified agreements and disagreements. 
The general point, then, is that there is an environment 
in these market research focus groups where agreement and 
disagreement tokens are treated as acceptable.  This 
environment is one where the participants are offering 
categorical judgements, or judgements on a numerical 
continuum, rather than qualitative opinions.  
Discussion 
Let us summarise the main points of our analysis before 
discussing some more general issues to do with focus group 
practice and the discursive social psychology of attitudes. We 
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have tried to show the way freestanding individual opinion 
packages are produced in focus groups.  That is, although 
evaluative talk is recurrently produced in the form of 
rhetorical contrasts and agreement/disagreement tokens, the 
moderator deals with this kind of talk in three particular 
ways.   
 First, and most simply, it is ignored (Sections 1 & 2).   
 Second, various occasioned meta rules or injunctions are 
developed to support the production of freestanding opinion 
packages (Section 3).   
 Third, when moderators formulate opinion packages out of 
sequences where participants produce them rhetorically and 
contrastively, these rhetorical elements are stripped off to 
leave freestanding opinion packages (Section 4).   
Finally, we considered deviant cases.  The only examples 
that fell outside the three management techniques where those 
where participants were offering categorical judgements.  
We have concentrated here specifically on the 
individuation of evaluative talk into personal opinion 
packages.  However, elsewhere we have considered the way in 
which moderators generate ‘opinion talk’ rather than ‘factual 
talk’, as well as the use of ‘repeat receipts’ as a common 
device for stripping off rhetorical orientations (Puchta, 
1999; Puchta & Potter, forthcoming). 
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With respect to the practice of focus groups, the 
production of individual and freestanding opinions is 
typically what is required.  For example, one of the most 
popular manuals on the conduct and analysis of focus groups 
describes three different models of report writing: 
The first style of presentation consists of the question 
or idea and is followed by all participant comments (the 
raw data model). The second style is a summary 
description followed by illustrative quotes (the 
description model). The third style is a summary 
description with illustrative quotes followed by an 
interpretation (the interpretative model). (Krueger, 
1994:167, emphasis added) 
Krueger gives examples of ‘illustrative quotes’ for a 
focus group on the topic what parents look for in youth 
organizations: 
The person in charge must be a good influence because 
children idolize their leaders.  
Leaders are the most important thing in a youth 
organization. I don't want a crank for a leader.  
I want a adult who is patient and kind to work with my 
kids. (1994:167) 
Such quotes are in the form of what we have called 
freestanding opinion packages.  For example, they are similar 
to the participant’s utterance in Extract 1 that was 
considered worth writing down by the moderator:  
>Well I'll stick to it.< I think it's a bit aromatic.
6
 
What we have observed in our materials, then, is in line 
with the ‘good practice’ formulated by Krueger.   
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We do not wish to criticise this practice here; in some 
ways it seems to be well suited to the goals of market 
research.  We can speculate that such freestanding opinion 
packages are relatively easy to understand for the audience 
watching the group, and relatively easy to draw market-related 
conclusions from.  Furthermore, they provide relatively 
straightforward raw material for the moderator to write up.  
Colourful descriptive evaluations can be tied to individual 
participants and the scope of agreement/disagreement tokens 
does not have to be determined. This may provide a simpler 
basis on which to make practical recommendations.   
What we have revealed are the detailed interactional 
procedures through which these opinion packages are produced.  
It may be that an alternative moderating and analytic practice 
that highlights rather than obscures the rhetorical 
organization of evaluations would be a basis for different or 
even improved recommendations.  However, we have no evidence 
either way on this issue.  Moreover, it would be a 
particularly difficult issue to resolve: for what neutral 
method would be used to assess the impact of these different 
methodological practices?  Luckily this is, anyway, not our 
primary concern in this paper. 
Our broader concern is with the nature of opinions and 
attitudes and their conceptualization in social psychology.  
We started with the puzzle that traditional attitude research 
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tends to discover enduring underlying attitudes without being 
troubled by the kinds of variability and rhetorical 
organization highlighted in DSP.  Our proposed methodological 
answer to this puzzle is that attitude measurement procedures 
have features that obscure these features.  The example of 
market research focus groups illustrates one way in which this 
can happen. 
This evidence does not directly undermine traditional 
conceptualizations of attitudes in favour of the DSP approach 
to evaluative practices.  Nor does it criticise recent 
developments in attitude theory.  That is not its point.  
Rather it counters the argument that the DSP approach cannot 
be true because various kinds of traditional attitude research 
work.  It illustrates one way in which such work may miss the 
phenomena highlighted by DSP.  And it complements arguments 
about the way quantitative attitude measures may miss such 
phenomena for different reasons (Billig, et al., 1988; Potter, 
1998; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). 
To end with we would like to offer two more general 
points.  First, it is undoubtedly the case that the 
reconstruction of rhetorically embedded evaluations into 
freestanding opinion packages is not restricted to focus 
groups.  Our guess is that it is a feature of a range of 
everyday and institutional practices.  One of the aims of a 
discursive social psychology of evaluation will be to study 
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these practices and highlight both their generic and specific 
features. 
 Second, and more speculatively, we would like to 
highlight a link to more sociological and historical 
conceptualizations of the nature of social science and its 
objects.  One of the arguments of the philosopher and 
discourse analyst Michel Foucault (1972) is that the objects 
of social science study are constituted out of its discourse 
practices.  Much work within the Foucaultian research 
tradition has taken an expansive historical perspective (e.g. 
Danziger, 1990; Rose, 1989).  In this case we have shown how 
the practices of focus group moderation can constitute 
freestanding opinion packages as social science objects. 
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1  The pseudonyms of two brands are airports to show that they belong to 
the same ‘family’. 
2  The participant refers to the nicotine and tar level of cigarettes as 
declared on the respective packet. 
3  This defies transcription as the participants say one after another 
and simultaneously ‘Me too,’. 
4  This defies transcription as the participants say one after another 
and simultaneously ‘Yes,’. 
5  This defies transcription as the participants say one after another 
and simultaneously ‘No,’. 
6  Utterance is in contrast to Figure 1 not schematically summarized, 
but directly transcribed. 
